This paper studies the macroeconomic conditions and policy environments under which stock market booms occurred among ten developed countries during the 20 th Century. We find that booms tended to occur during periods of above-average growth of real output, and below-average and falling inflation. We also find that booms often ended within a few months of an increase in inflation and monetary policy tightening. The evidence suggests that booms reflect both real macroeconomic phenomena and monetary policy, as well as the extant regulatory environment.
I. Introduction
Since the mid-1990s, many countries have experienced prolonged periods of rapid price appreciation in equity, housing, and other asset markets which have drawn the attention of economists and policymakers to the role of asset prices in the propagation of business cycles. Economists disagree about the appropriate response of monetary policy to asset price booms. Some argue that financial markets are inherently volatile and that market prices often stray from fundamentals, suggesting that policymakers could improve welfare by deflating asset price booms, especially if sudden asset price declines are likely to depress economic activity. Other economists claim that financial markets process information efficiently, or that policymakers usually cannot determine when assets are mispriced and, hence, that they cannot enhance aggregate welfare by reacting to asset price movements.
Financial historians have long been fascinated by the behavior of asset markets, especially asset price bubbles, crashes and other dramatic phenomena. Research on these episodes has yielded important information about the development of financial markets, and the effects of financial regulation and macroeconomic policy on the stability of markets. 1 We believe that history can also inform the debate about the appropriate response, if any, of monetary policy to asset price booms. Accordingly, this paper investigates the macroeconomic and policy environments in which stock market booms occurred among ten developed countries during the 20 th Century. Our multi-country historical approach enables us to explore the association between stock market booms and key macroeconomic and monetary policy variables across a variety of policy regimes and regulatory environments.
1 Among Larry Neal's important contributions in this area are his work on the South Sea Bubble, the development of European capital markets from the 16 th to 19 th Centuries (Neal, 1990) , and the British financial crisis of 1825 (Neal, 1998) .
We construct monthly, real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) stock price indexes for ten countries for which the necessary data are readily available over most of the 20 th Century.
We then identify extended periods of unusually rapid appreciation in the indexes for each country, which we define as booms. Finally, we use a simple event methodology to study the behavior of key macroeconomic and monetary policy variables during stock market booms.
We find that booms generally occurred during periods of above-average economic growth and below-average inflation, and that booms typically ended when monetary policy tightened in response to rising inflation. Most booms were procyclical -arising during business cycle recoveries and expansions, and ending when rising inflation and tighter monetary policy were followed by declining economic activity. We also find, however, that some 20 th Century booms were not associated with rapid economic growth or low inflation, and that stock markets were often affected by changes in regulation and other events, such as oil price shocks and political upheaval.
Although we are able to examine stock markets and macroeconomic conditions in a variety of settings, the limited variety and frequency of historical data for many countries necessarily means that our study is more impressionistic than formal. For example, whereas the standard efficient markets present value model posits that stock prices reflect discounted expected future dividends, we lack data to estimate confidently expected dividend growth or changes in the discount factor. Hence, we do not address directly the question whether specific stock market booms degenerated into bubbles. Policymakers are unlikely ever to have data that enable them to identify bubbles definitively as they arise, however, and a review of historical experiences can provide insights that help policymakers respond to events in real time.
Section II briefly summarizes prior findings and presents information about the stock market booms in our data. Sections III and IV examine the macroeconomic conditions under which 20 th Century stock market booms occurred among the ten countries. Section V summarizes our observations and conclusions.
II. Stock Market Booms and Crashes
Most studies of the relationship between asset booms and macroeconomic conditions focus on the consequences of booms and, especially, of market crashes for macroeconomic activity. Several draw lessons for policy from crash experiences. Recent examples include Bordo (2003) , Mishkin and White (2003) , and Helbling and Terrones (2004) . Bordo (2003) finds that many, but by no means all U.S. and British stock market crashes of the 19 th and 20 th Centuries were followed by recessions. A serious decline in economic activity was more likely, he concludes, if a crash was accompanied or followed by a banking panic. Mishkin and White (2003) come to a similar conclusion in their review of U.S. stock market crashes in the 20 th Century. They find that a severe economic downturn was more likely to follow a crash if the crash was accompanied by a widening of interest rate credit spreads. The key lesson for policy, Mishkin and White (2003) argue, is that policymakers should focus on the financial instability that can arise in the wake of crashes, rather than on crashes per se. Whereas numerous studies explore the effects of stock market crashes, relatively few examine the conditions under which stock market booms arise or persist. In a prior paper (Bordo and Wheelock, 2004) , we examined episodes of unusually rapid growth of U.S.
nominal stock prices during the 19 th and 20 th Centuries. We found that many such episodes occurred when real output and productivity growth (both labor productivity and total factor productivity) were unusually rapid, suggesting that stock prices were at least partly justified by macroeconomic conditions. By contrast, we found no consistent relationship between the growth of nominal stock prices and inflation, but noted that inflation was usually low and stable during periods of rapid growth in real stock prices. Here we explore in more depth the macroeconomic conditions under which stock market booms have occurred in the United
States and nine other developed countries. In so doing, we hope to obtain insights about the macroeconomic conditions and policies that seem to foster booms, and whether experiences differ across countries.
Defining Booms
There is, of course, no precise empirical definition of an asset boom, and researchers have imposed a number of filters to identify specific episodes that they then define as booms.
We adapt the methodology of Pagan and Sossounov (2003) to identify prolonged periods of rapidly rising real stock prices in ten countries for which monthly data on a nominal stock price index and a consumer price index are available from the early 1920s onward:
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 3 We identify the maximum and minimum observations of the real stock price within rolling, 25-month windows. We require that market peaks and troughs alternate, and so eliminate all but the highest maximum that occurred before a subsequent trough, and all but the lowest minimum that occurred before a subsequent peak.
We classify as booms all periods of at least three years from trough to peak with an average annual rate of increase in the real stock price index of at least 10 percent. We also classify as booms a few episodes of exceptional real stock price appreciation that were shorter than three years.
4 Table 1 lists the episodes we define as booms for each country in our sample. For each boom, we include information about the average annual percentage increase in the market index from the market trough to its peak. Because several booms began as recoveries from market declines, we also note when the real stock price surpassed its prior 25-month peak, and report the average annual percentage increase in the index after that date.
For comparison, Table 1 also reports information about long-run average annual rates of change in the real stock price index for each country. For example, the U.S. real stock price index increased at an average annual rate of 2.4 percent during 1915-40, and at an average annual rate of 4.4 percent during . Thus, the periods we define as booms were characterized by rates of appreciation that were substantially higher than long-run averages. Finally, Table 1 also includes information about the extent to which the real stock price index declined during the 12 months following a market peak, and from the market 3 We selected our sample countries based on the availability of historical data on a stock market index and key macroeconomic series, which obviously gives rise to possible sample selection bias. We are unsure of the extent to which our findings would differ if our sample included recently developed or emerging market economies. The appendix describes our data and sources. 4 Helbling and Terrones (2004) use a similar procedure to identify booms and busts. Specifically, they identify turning points in the log-level of real equity prices over five quarter windows, and define booms (busts) as the largest one-fourth of all price increases (declines).
peak to the next market trough. Almost all booms were followed by real declines of at least 10 percent within 12 months. Not all booms ended with a spectacular crash, however, and the lengths and sizes of market declines after booms varied widely.
Comparison of stock price index growth rates is problematic because of differences in index composition across countries and over time. Additional information on the co-movement of stock markets among our sample countries is illustrated in Figure 2 . We computed rolling, five-year correlations in the monthly percentage changes in the real stock price indexes of each pair of countries in our sample. Figure 2 plots the monthly averages of these correlations between 1920 and 1999. thorough review of the myriad regulations imposed on equity markets over time across the ten countries in our sample is beyond the scope of this paper. We note, however, several instances in which stock market booms appear to have been associated with changes in regulation or other policies.
We begin our study of the macroeconomic environments of stock market booms by examining annual data on real GDP growth and inflation across all boom episodes listed in Table 1 . In Section IV, we focus separately on stock market booms of the interwar, early post-World War II, and post-1970 periods.
For all stock market booms listed in Table 1 , we computed real GDP growth relative to its long-run average for each market peak year and the eight years before and after each peak. 5 Real GDP growth exceeded its long-run average during a majority of stock market booms. Figure 3 plots the median real GDP growth rate (relative to its long-run average) in market peak years (year "0") and in the eight years before and after market peaks. 6 The chart illustrates that across all booms, median real GDP growth increased sharply relative to its long-run average during the two years prior to a stock market peak, and exceeded its long-run average by 1.5 percentage points in both the market peak and prior years. Median growth also fell sharply during the two years following a peak. Thus, the typical boom arose when output growth was above average and rising, and ended when output growth stopped increasing. Median output growth fell sharply in the year following a market peak and many booms were followed by a period of economic contraction.
Figure 3 also shows the mean absolute deviation of observations around the median, illustrating the dispersion in GDP growth rates across boom episodes. Observations on output growth are less dispersed during booms, which usually lasted for three to five years before a market peak, than before. Observations are least dispersed from about two years before a market peak year (year "−2") to about two years after a peak year (year "2").
Figure 4 plots median inflation (relative to its long-run average) during booms and their aftermath. 7 Booms tended to arise when inflation was below its long-run average and also falling. The median inflation rate was approximately 1 percentage point below its longrun average between four and seven years before a market peak, and 2 percentage points below its long-run average during the two years prior to a market peak. Inflation tended to return slowly to its long-run average after a market peak. Figure 4 also illustrates the dispersion of observations around the median, as shown by the mean absolute deviation of observations around the median. As with GDP growth, the dispersion of inflation rates around their long-run averages declines over time toward the market peak year.
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IV. The Macroeconomic Environments of 20 th Century Booms: Subperiods
Although a majority of 20 th Century stock market booms in our sample countries occurred during periods of above average real output growth and below average inflation, many booms occurred when output growth was near normal, or even below normal, and/or when inflation exceeded its long-run average. Moreover, booms occurred under a variety of macroeconomic and regulatory policy regimes. We next examine the association of macroeconomic and monetary policy conditions and stock market booms during the interwar, early post-World War II, and recent decades separately. In so doing, we seek to learn more about the associations between macroeconomic conditions, monetary policy, and booms under different environments.
The Interwar Period
World War I was, of course, a major shock to the world's principal economies.
Differences in the pace of post-war recovery in individual countries reflected both the extent to which countries were involved in the war and in the economic policies their governments pursued after the war. The United States, for example, experienced high inflation in 1918-19 but deflation and a sharp, but short-lived recession in 1920-21. The abrupt change in macroeconomic conditions reflected a shift from a highly expansionary monetary policy 8 Bordo and Wheelock (2006) compare GDP growth and inflation during U.S. booms with the medians across the remaining nine sample countries. They find that the behavior of output and inflation were similar across U.S. and non-U.S. booms, but that, if anything, the association of booms with above-average output growth and below-average inflation was stronger across U.S. booms than across the non-U.S. median. geared toward financing the government's debt at low interest rates to a tight policy aimed at quashing inflation and protecting the Federal Reserve's gold reserves. 9 The Fed reversed course again in 1922 and the economy recovered quickly. The U.S. economy enjoyed strong average growth and low, stable inflation throughout the remainder of the decade.
The U.S. stock market ran a parallel course, with significant losses during the recession of 1921 followed by a strong recovery. After a brief relapse in 1923, the market turned upward and posted several years of rapid real price appreciation until the market peak in September 1929. Financial historians and other observers have long debated whether the U.S. market was over-valued at its peak. Such notable economists as Fisher (1930) and, more recently, McGratton and Prescott (2004) argue that economic fundamentals could justify stock prices even at the market's 1929 peak. Similar to the "new economy" stories that appeared to explain the stock market boom of the 1990s, advances in technology and management practices were often cited in the 1920s as reasons why U.S. corporations could expect high earnings growth that justified the large increase in stock prices (White, 2006) .
The 1920s saw rapid diffusion of electric power, the internal combustion engine, and other "great inventions" of the late 19 th and early 20 th Centuries in American factories and homes (David, 1990; Gordon, 2000) . U.S. firms, especially in the manufacturing sector, experienced high average growth of labor and total factor productivity over the decade, though annual estimates suggest that productivity growth had slowed by the time the stock market boom was in full swing.
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9 See Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Meltzer (2003) . 10 Productivity change is most appropriately measured between business cycle peaks or other similar points in the business cycle. However, private domestic labor productivity (output/hours) and total factor productivity rose at average annual rates of 3.0 and 2.62 percent during 1920-24, and at average rates of 1.74 and 1.32 percent during 1925-29. In the manufacturing sector, labor productivity rose at an average annual rate of 7.0 percent during 1920-24 and 3.90 percent during 1925-29 (Private domestic productivity: Kendrick, 1961, Rappoport and White (1993) reach a similar conclusion from examining the premium on brokers loans. Other authors, such as Galbraith (1955) , emphasize the rapid growth of investment trusts and commercial bank securities affiliates in the 1920s, and their role in enticing unsophisticated investors to the market.
The Federal Reserve did not officially address the question whether the stock market was over-valued, but Fed officials were concerned about the growth of loans used to purchase stocks, and the possibility that Federal Reserve credit was being used to support that growth. The Federal Reserve tightened abruptly in 1928, and pursued a tight policy through the market crash in October 1929 in an effort to choke off the flow of credit to the market. This policy was reflected in both a sharp increase in interest rates and a slowing of money stock growth, which preceded the business cycle peak and may have hastened the economic contraction of 1929-33. 11 Besides the United States, five of the other nine countries in our sample experienced a stock market boom in the 1920s as their economies recovered from wartime disruption and as international capital markets were reintegrated under the gold exchange standard. Several countries experienced a brief period of rapidly rising real stock prices during the recovery of 1922-24, and a more sustained appreciation when their currencies were made convertible into gold or other hard currencies.
The experiences of France and the United Kingdom, for example, illustrate a close association between macroeconomic conditions and policies, and stock market performance.
France had a market boom associated with a business cycle recovery in 1920-24, though in real terms the stock market moved little beyond its previous cycle peak. Stock prices then declined rapidly as monetization of government deficits produced inflation and capital flight.
The market decline continued until November 1926, when the government budget was brought under control and investors became convinced that inflation would not reignite. Economic recovery brought renewed vigor to financial markets in the mid-1930s, when stock market booms occurred in eight of our ten sample countries. As in the 1920s, the timing and extent of these booms were tied to economic recovery and the macroeconomic policies pursued in individual countries. Currency devaluation and/or the imposition of restrictions on gold convertibility was a precursor to economic recovery in many countries (Eichengreen, 1992) . Britain abandoned the gold standard in September 1931, and several other countries quickly followed. Stock prices began to rise in the United Kingdom and other countries in mid-1932. Although stock prices posted gains in some countries that remained on gold, most countries did not have a sustained boom until they had abandoned the gold standard or at least devalued. The United States, for example, experienced a financial crisis and market crash in early 1933, followed by a brief recovery after the Roosevelt Administration suspended gold convertibility and restored confidence in the U.S.
banking system. A sustained boom did not begin until the second quarter of 1935, however, when output growth stabilized and the economy began to grow consistently. 13 Eichengreen (1992, pp. 344) 
Early Post-World War II Era
Stock market booms of the interwar period were closely associated with economic growth, inflation, and both domestic and international monetary policies. New regulations on securities markets and capital flows were introduced during the Great Depression, and intensified during World War II. We next examine stock market booms of the first two decades after the war, when controls on the allocation of economic resources were slowly eased and the international monetary system was reestablished, but many markets remained tightly regulated and international capital flows were restricted.
International capital mobility hit a low point during and immediately after World War II as a result of exchange controls imposed during the Great Depression and strengthened during the war (Obstfeld and Taylor, 1998, pp. 381-91 
Stock Market Booms of the 1970s-90s
We examine stock market booms of the 1970s-90s separately from those of the 1950s-60s because the macroeconomic and regulatory environments of the two periods differ markedly, and because high frequency observations on a greater variety of macroeconomic series are available only for the period since 1970. The 1970s witnessed the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, two major energy market shocks, high inflation, and a world-wide slowdown in productivity growth. Only two of our ten countries experienced a stock market boom in the 1970s -Australia and Canada. In both countries, rising commodity prices brought improved terms of trade and a rising stock market. Energy and mining stocks have relatively heavy weight in the market indexes of both countries.
The 1980s and 1990s, by contrast, saw declining energy prices and inflation, higher average output growth, and buoyant financial markets in many countries. Several countries eliminated capital controls and deregulated financial markets and institutions in these years, and financial markets became more integrated across countries. All ten countries experienced a stock market boom during the 1980s, and all but Japan had a boom in the 1990s.
18 Calomiris and Wheelock (1998) show that the Fed reacted to rising (falling) inflation by draining (adding) reserves from the banking system, and Romer and Romer (2002) find that during the 1950s the Fed's actions satisfied the so-called Taylor Principle in that policy resulted in changes in the real interest rate that exceeded changes in the rate of inflation.
Advances in information-processing technologies that facilitated global financial transactions and innovations encouraged financial deregulation. Countries adopted reforms to increase the efficiency of their domestic financial markets, tap foreign capital, and respond to various financial innovations, such as electronic trading and trading in stock market futures and options.
The world's first electronic stock exchange, the Nasdaq market, was created in the United States in 1971. The United States deregulated brokerage commissions in the mid1970s. Other countries followed suit in the 1980s and 1990s, abolishing minimum brokerage commissions and controls on the ownership of brokers and dealers, and establishing electronic trading and derivative securities markets.
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The United Kingdom removed exchange controls in 1979; Japan and Germany followed suit in 1980 and 1984 (Yamada, 1991) . Other European countries eliminated controls on capital in the late 1980s and early 1990s under the terms of the European Economic and Monetary Union.
In several countries, the removal of capital controls and deregulation of financial markets occurred as part of a sea change in economic policy. Tax cuts, especially on capital income, widespread deregulation of industry, and monetary policies that brought inflation under control produced a more favorable business climate in many countries than had prevailed in the 1970s. In the United States, these policies were augmented by less aggressive anti-trust enforcement, which encouraged mergers and acquisitions and a booming stock market (Wigmore, 1997) .
Next, we identify the macroeconomic conditions under which stock market booms occurred during the 1970s-90s. Figure 9 plots quarterly observations on median real GDP growth (relative to its long-run average) during boom episodes. 20 In contrast to earlier periods, when output growth typically exceeded its long-run average during booms, median output growth hovered near its long-run average across the stock market booms of the 1970s-90s. The median belies considerable variation in output growth rates across stock market booms, however. Several countries had a stock market boom in the mid-to-late 1990s.
During these booms, output growth exceeded its long-run average in Australia, Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States, but was near or below average in France, Germany, and Italy. growth was near its long-run average. 21 Thus, by occurring when productivity growth was above average, the U.S. boom of 1994-2000 was unusual among booms of the 1980s-90s. last eight months of booms. Thus, we again find that booms typically ended following a period of monetary policy tightening associated with rising inflation.
V. Observations and Conclusions
Our study of 20 th Century stock market booms among ten developed countries finds that markets reflect both underlying macroeconomic conditions and specific economic policy actions. We find that stock market booms were an element of the business cycle, with booms typically arising during cyclical recoveries and other periods of rapid economic growth and ending when GDP growth slowed. Many stock market booms were followed by large declines in real stock prices, if not outright market crashes, and a slowing of economic activity. We also find an association between stock market booms and monetary policy.
Booms typically arose when inflation was low and declining, and ended within a few months of an increase in the rate of inflation. Rising inflation tended to bring tighter monetary conditions, reflected in higher real interest rates, declining term spreads, and reduced money stock growth.
During the interwar period, the timing and extent of stock market booms in several countries bore a close relationship to exchange rate policies. France, for example, experienced a stock market boom in 1926-29, after its exchange rate was pegged at a level that encouraged capital inflows and fiscal and monetary policies were adopted that brought inflation under control. The United Kingdom, by contrast, pursued an overvalued exchange rate during the 1920s that resulted in capital outflows, slow economic growth and only modest real stock price appreciation. Similarly, in many countries, the timing of economic recovery and stock market booms during the 1930s were closely associated with devaluation or outright abandonment of the gold standard.
Stock market booms of the 1950s and 1960s reflected economic recovery and rapid growth after World War II. In Europe, actions to reopen markets to trade and capital flows also buoyed financial markets and contributed to two waves of stock market booms. We note in particular an apparent association between stock market booms in several European countries and the dismantling of trade barriers and exchange controls in the late 1950s.
Finally, stock market booms of the 1970s-90s were somewhat less commonly associated with rapid economic growth, though the U.S. boom of 1994-2000 did occur during a period of rapid output and productivity growth, as well as low inflation. We speculate that financial deregulation and globalization weakened the links between domestic economic growth and stock markets in the 1980s-90s.
Stock market booms tended to be roughly in sync across countries throughout the 20 th Century. Several countries had booms in the 1920s, mid-1930s, 1950s, mid-1980s , and late 1990s, whereas few countries had booms between 1965 and 1980. Stock market returns were more highly correlated across countries during boom periods than at other times. The average correlation was especially high during the late 1920s and 1980s-90s, when financial markets and capital flows were comparatively unregulated. In these decades, international financial markets were relatively highly integrated. Average correlation was relatively low, and booms were less in sync, during the 1950s and 1960s when many of the financial regulations and capital controls imposed during the Great Depression and strengthened during World War II remained in force and interfered with international market integration.
By studying the behavior of financial markets under a variety macroeconomic and policy environments, financial historians can provide much needed insights that help in devising policies that promote the efficient and stable operation of financial markets. The history of 20 th Century stock market booms illustrates a close connections between domestic and international macroeconomic policies, financial regulation, and the performance of stock markets. Our review finds that stock market booms have been closely related to monetary policies, as reflected both by the level of inflation and actions to control inflation. Further, we find that international economic policies, such as capital controls and exchange rate pegs, and financial regulation affect the linkages between domestic economic performance and stock markets. A key lesson for policy, therefore, is that the effects of macroeconomic policies on asset markets are likely to be influenced by both the domestic regulation and the international integration of those markets. Thus, the efficient operation of financial markets would seem to hinge on both macroeconomic and regulatory policies, and how well those policies interact with one another.
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